The video revisits the controversial story behind the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, focusing on the role of an Iraqi defector known as "Curveball." Despite initial claims by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, Curveball's false intelligence dramatically influenced U.S. policy and the decision to go to war. His fabrications became central to the argument made by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the United Nations.

Investigative insights reveal how Curveball, whose real name is Rafed Alwan, came to concoct a tale about Iraq's supposed mobile biological weapons program. After defecting from Iraq, Alwan narrated an elaborate story mixing truths and fabrications which were eagerly accepted by German intelligence and later by U.S. intelligence agencies desperate for credible evidence against Saddam. Despite being unverified, Curveball's narratives were used to justify military action, showcasing immense ramifications of the deceptions.

Main takeaways from the video:

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Curveball, an Iraqi defector, fabricated stories about Iraq's WMD program, which significantly influenced the U.S. decision to invade Iraq.
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His testimony was unverified yet was used by high-level U.S. officials, including Colin Powell, in international discussions.
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Intelligence failures are highlighted alongside the power of convincing narratives, showcasing the broader impacts of misinformation in geopolitical decisions.
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Key Vocabularies and Common Phrases:

1. invasion [ɪnˈveɪʒən] - (noun) - An instance of invading a country or region with an armed force. - Synonyms: (incursion, attack, assault)

Next Saturday will mark the 8th anniversary of America's invasion of Iraq.

2. defector [dɪˈfɛktər] - (noun) - A person who abandons their country or cause in favor of an opposing one. - Synonyms: (deserter, renegade, traitor)

Incredibly, it was all because of one man, an Iraqi defector codenamed Curveball, who spun a web of lies which convinced America's top spies.

3. unapologetic [ˌʌnpəˌlɑːdʒəˈtɛtɪk] - (adjective) - Not acknowledging or expressing regret for a wrongdoing or offense. - Synonyms: (unrepentant, defiant, unremorseful)

But he was unapologetic, hard to pin down, and really nervous.

4. interrogators [ɪnˈtɛrəˌɡeɪtərz] - (noun) - People who question someone closely, often in an aggressive way. - Synonyms: (questioners, examiners, inquisitors)

@ first, Alwan told the truth to his interrogators

5. purification [ˌpjʊərəfɪˈkeɪʃən] - (noun) - The process of removing contaminants or impurities. - Synonyms: (cleansing, refining, filtering)

The Iraqis said it was a seed purification plant.

6. alluring [əˈlʊrɪŋ] - (adjective) - Powerfully and mysteriously attractive or fascinating. - Synonyms: (enticing, captivating, seductive)

Curveball's information became especially alluring because in December 1998, Saddam kicked out the UN weapons inspectors, leaving CIA inboxes empty.

7. staggered [ˈstæɡərd] - (adjective) - Astonished or deeply shocked. - Synonyms: (astounded, stunned, amazed)

The Germans were so staggered by Alwan's story, they hid their prize source in this hotel in the town of Erlangen.

8. confronted [kənˈfrʌntɪd] - (verb) - Faced up to and dealt with a problem or difficult situation. - Synonyms: (challenged, opposed, faced)

American intelligence agents found Dr. Basel outside of Iraq and confronted him about the biological program.

9. cooperative [koʊˈɒpərətɪv] - (adjective) - Involving mutual assistance in working toward a common goal. - Synonyms: (collaborative, supportive, helpful)

In Germany, after months of interrogation, Curveball became less cooperative.

10. rationale [ˌræʃəˈnæl] - (noun) - A set of reasons or a logical basis for a course of action or belief. - Synonyms: (justification, reasoning, explanation)

Kerbal had already provided what the Bush administration needed to beat the war drums against Saddam Hussein. He offered the best rationale for the course of action that the White House elected to take.

Curve Ball - 60 Minutes Archive

Next Saturday will mark the 8th anniversary of America's invasion of Iraq. And after all this time, questions still remain as to why the United States launched the war in the first place. The Bush administration said it was because of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But there were no such weapons. So how did US Intelligence get it so wrong? Incredibly, it was all because of one man, an Iraqi defector codenamed Curveball, who spun a web of lies which convinced America's top spies. His allegations became the crown jewel of the case Colin Powell made to the United nations before the war.

Three years ago, we told you part of this story, but we were missing one crucial element. Curveball himself. We couldn't find him. Well, finally we did. So tonight we're going to introduce you to the man and ask you to ponder how anyone could ever have believed one word he said. Do you think that you helped get Saddam Hussein out of Iraq? Yes, Exactly.

And here he is, the Iraqi informer who became known as Curveball. His real name is Rafael, a 44 year old chemical engineer who says he had a mission. So you left Iraq with the idea of destroying Saddam Hussein? Exactly. We sat down with Curveball in Europe. We agreed not to reveal exactly where. What made him decide to talk to us? We still don't know. But he was unapologetic, hard to pin down, and really nervous.

One minute, please. Not sure how much he could reveal about how he fooled Western intelligence services into believing that Iraq had a secret program to brew mobile biological weapons. I planned for this for a long time. He came up with the plan after he escaped from Iraq in the late 1990s. But curiously, instead of taking his story to a Western embassy, which is what defectors usually do, he just drifted from one country to another.

You went to Jordan? Libya? Yes. Morocco? Yes. Spain? Yes. Belgium? Yes. To Morocco again? Yes. And then to Germany? Yes. It's a lot of traveling. Yes. How did you get the money to do that traveling? Some person in Belgium. He's my neighbor in Iraq and he give me also a lot of money. You've got nice neighbors.

Alwan actually wanted to go to England, where he says he hoped to lure the British into thinking Saddam had biological weapons. In November 1999, he took a train from Belgium to Germany, where he was to contact a man who would smuggle him into Britain. The meeting point, The Grand Cathedral in Cologne. He waited and waited. The smuggler never showed. The police found you? Yes. And I don't have passport, I don't have identity card. I don't have visa. You must go to the police station.

Halouan was taken to this refugee center outside Nuremberg where he was visited by the BND German Intelligence. At first, Alwan told the truth to his interrogators. I see. I am chemical engineer, he said. You were a chemical engineer? Yes, that's my. Which was the truth? Yes. He then mixed a few facts with a heavy dose of fiction. He told German intelligence that in 1995 he'd been made a director at this site outside Baghdad called Jerf on the daf.

The Iraqis said it was a seed purification plant. But Alwan told the Germans he was present when mobile biological weapons were being made there. We've diagrammed how. Alwan told the Germans that specially equipped trucks made their way to one end of warehouse one, entered doors there hooked up to hoses and pumps and brewed biological agents. Smaller vehicles then took the finished product away and exiting hidden doors at the other end.

The Germans were so staggered by Alwan's story, they hid their prize source in this hotel in the town of Erlangen. He was given the code name Curveball and was interrogated intensively for most of 2000. The Germans told US intelligence that curveball didn't want to meet with Americans. So all Washington got Washington were summaries of his debriefings. But the reports were quite enough to make American intelligence analysts stand up and take notice.

When you look at the written reports and there are about 100 of them, you get a sense of someone who is there. It's convincing. He described Charles Delfer had been a leader of the UN inspections team during the 1990s. After the war began, the CIA sent him to Iraq to look for those weapons of mass destruction. Delfer has read the Curveball reports. It would be difficult for someone to read those and stand up and say, none of this can possibly be true.

Michael Kirk so in other words, not only German intelligence, but the CIA wasn't making a mistake at first to take this very seriously. Well, the CIA would have been at fault to not take it very seriously. Saddam had produced biological weapons until he was caught by UN inspectors after the first Gulf War, Curveball's information became especially alluring because in December 1998, Saddam kicked out the UN weapons inspectors, leaving CIA inboxes empty.

So when the UN inspectors left, they were left blind. Nothing there, nothing there. And all of a sudden they've got to make assessments and predictions based on no information. And then comes along Curveball, along comes Curveball, and Curveball spun a Tail. And he was telling everyone exactly what they expected to hear. So Curveball was sowing his seeds in a very fertile field. Precisely.

The most alarming part of his story was something he said happened at Jurfelnadoff in 1998. A biological accident that killed 12 technicians and turned their skin black. You did tell the Germans that there had been an accident at your fellowdot. I told that. I told you exactly. I told this story. CIA analysts also found Curveball credible because he named names.

He said that while he was working at jurf El Nadaf, Dr. Basil El Sati, a noted Iraqi scientist, was the senior official in charge of the secret biological weapons program. American intelligence agents found Dr. Basel outside of Iraq and confronted him about the biological program. They were asking me, what was the program and how far did we go? But they told you they believed that you were in charge and I should tell them what was the program, which I said there was nothing like such a program.

I had the feeling that they thought I was lying. So to prove, to encourage me to tell the truth is to give me some, you know, some money. How much? Around 50, I would say. So the Americans offered you $50,000 for you to tell the truth? It was to encourage me to say what they thought it was the truth. Dr. Basel wouldn't take the money.

In Germany, after months of interrogation, Curveball became less cooperative. He refused to talk to intelligence agents for nearly a year. He needed work and got a job in Erlangen here at Burger King. The CIA didn't know about his new career or much else about him. We didn't know any of that stuff, beginning with we had never met with him and didn't even know his name or what he did.

Tyler Drumhiller was the CIA's European division chief at the time. He says when doubts were raised inside the agency over Curveball, the skeptics were shouted down. There were meetings that were so angry and so violent, you know, people cursing at each other and yelling, you know, how dare you question us? Kerbal had already provided what the Bush administration needed to beat the war drums against Saddam Hussein.

He offered the best rationale for the course of action that the White House elected to take. The fundamental argument on weapons of mass destruction did pivot on this guy, Curveball. To make that argument before the world, President Bush selected the most trusted man in his administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Could Secretary Powell have given his speech to the United nations that he did give if there hadn't been a curveball? I don't think so. There would have been nothing else to talk about except things that have been talked about a million times before. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. On February 5, 2003, Powell stated, With no qualifications that Saddam Hussein had mobile biological weapons. The only source for that, a man no American had ever questioned. Curveball.

The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents. Prominently displayed were models of the mobile trucks Kerbal had sketched to the Germans.

Kerbal now admits it was just that, a sketch, a product of his fertile imagination. Did you see trucks carrying biological weapons going inside and outside of Giraffe Nadov after 1995? No. I told you no. I told you exactly no. And that biological accident at Jurfal? Nadam Kervaugh said he witnessed the accident which killed 12 people and blackened their skin. It never happened. And it turns out Djurfalnadorf really was a seed purification plant. Curveball, who worked there procuring parts, wasn't even at the plant when he said the accident happened. In 1998.

How long did you work at Jurfelnadoff? Four months. Four months? Yes. When did you leave Jurfeln, Duff? I think in 1994. 1994? Yes. His tale, which helped launch the war he now acknowledges was one big lie. The story that you said helped remove Saddam Hussein wasn't true, was it? No, not at all. The story will continue after this.

But there's still one maddening mystery. How did this low level chemical engineer, seen here at a 1993 Baghdad wedding, come up with such a detailed story? Did someone put him up to it? Did you make it up yourself? Yes. All by yourself? Yes. Some person. He gave me curveball, then hinted that someone may have helped him.

But exactly who? He just wouldn't give us a straight answer. But he did tell us he considers himself a hero for the important role he played in ousting Saddam. He even ran for a seat in the Iraqi parliament last March. He got creamed. Perhaps the voters didn't see him as the hero he claimed to be.

We showed excerpts of our interview to former CIA senior official Tyler Drumheller, now a consultant for 60 Minutes. Curveball insists he did all this to get Saddam out of Iraq. Believe him? No. I think he probably believes that himself now. I strongly feel that. That he did it at the time to be able to stay in Germany. If that's the case, he succeeded.

Today, Kerbla and his family have German passports and live in the southern part of the country. So now he apparently feels safe enough to tell his story. At least part of it. As our interview entered its second hour, we pressed him for the whole story. The full truth. Tell the truth. That's not for me. Telling the truth is not for you. You can't ask me. Tell the truth.

I cannot ask you to tell the truth. You are not. Okay, it's next time. Let's finish this time. Take a rest. Have a cigarette. And with that, Rafaed Alwan, the man who pulled off one of the deadliest con jobs in history, disappeared back into the shadows.

POLITICS, GLOBAL, PHILOSOPHY, IRAQ WAR, CIA, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, 60 MINUTES